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opment	perspectives.	The formal end of the recession will thus not be 
equivalent to the end of the crisis of the economic model. Instead there 
will only be a transition from the acute to the chronic phase charac-
terised above all by a gradual and unstoppable degradation of the Rus-
sian economy and the living standards of the Russian public. This is 
so because it is impossible to guarantee stable, economic growth of 
several per cent without extensive and painful system reforms.
•	However,	the	political	nature	of	the	sources	of	the	crisis	makes	it	signifi-
cantly	more	 difficult	 to	 overcome	 its	 consequences,	 because	 the	 govern-
ment	has	no	desire	to	overhaul	the	present	model	of	state	governance.	Their	
priorities	include	maintaining	control	over	political	and	social	life	and	re-
gaining	Russia’s	 superpower	 status	 on	 the	 international	 arena.	Econom-















the	 economic	 crisis	will	 not	 become	 an	 independent	 catalyst	 of	 a	 politi-

























I. From rEcESSIon To STagnaTIon – THE courSE and 
THE dynamIcS oF THE EconomIc crISIS In ruSSIa
Russia has been struggling with recession since 2015. This is the fourth 







Chart 1. The dynamics of GDP, industrial production and real disposable 
















I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV







Data on GDP growth may be substantially revised due to the modification of the methodology applied by 
Rosstat.

















problems	were	fully	laid	bare,	clear tendencies for crisis had been growing 










Chart 2. Dynamics of Urals oil prices and the dollar exchange rate 
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Source: Author’s own analysis on the basis of data from the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank of 

































* value of foreign currency reserves at the beginning of the month
Source: Author’s own analysis on the basis of data from the Central Bank of the Russian Federation 
(www.cbr.ru) 
The major fall in oil prices has proven durable and it has had the strongest 
direct effect on the deterioration of the macroeconomic indicators leading	
to	a	reduction	of	revenues	from	oil	exports	and	the	depreciation	of	the	Russian	
currency.	This	in	turn	increased	the	costs	of	both	imports	and	the	servicing	of	













4	 For	 information	 on	 the	 impact	 of	 financial	 sanctions	 on	 the	 Russian	 economy	 see,	Maria	
Domańska,	Szymon	Kardaś,	The	consequences	of	the	Western	financial	sanctions	on	the	Rus-
sian	 economy,	 OSW Commentary,	 24	 March	 2016,	 https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/
osw-commentary/2016-03-24/consequences-western-financial-sanctions-russian-economy
5	 In	 February	 2016,	 the	 US	 government	 recommended	 American	 banks	 to	 be	 cautious	
about	 participation	 in	 the	 placement	 of	 Russian	 treasury	 bonds	 since	 they	 might	 be	
used	as	a	 channel	 to	 indirectly	finance	 the	entities	on	 the	sanctions	 list.	A	similar	 recom-
mendation	 addressed	 to	 European	 banks	 was	 included	 in	 unofficial	 statements	 from	



















are	globalised,	the government has limited possibilities to neutralise eco-
nomic problems by way of the influx of money from other countries (even	
from	those	which	have	not	imposed	sanctions	on	Russia).	
As shown by macroeconomic data, a few characteristic features of the cri-
sis in Russia can be distinguished that	are	especially	visible	in	comparison	
with	the	recession	in	2009.	








tively mild impact of the crisis on the real sector facilitates its	gradual	ad-





























At the same time, detailed statistical data indicate that the anti-develop-
mental structure of the economy are becoming entrenched through adap-















However, the consequences of the crisis have most of all affected the 
Russian public, especially	the	poorest	sections	of	society13.	Proof of this 
can be found in the dynamics of the fall in the real disposable incomes 
of the population14.	Thus the recession seen in 2015–2016 radically differs 
9	 See	data	from	the	Ministry	of	Energy	and	the	Central	Bank	concerning	oil	and	gas	exports;	
S. Aleksashenko,	Is	Russia’s	Economy	Doomed	to	Collapse?,	1	July	2016,	http://nationalinter-







































The public is feeling the consequences of the crisis in two ways. On the 







On the other hand, the public has felt the negative consequences of the 



























































20	 Over	60%	of	respondents	estimate	that	it	will	 last	for	at	 least	a	year;	http://www.levada.
ru/2016/09/26/krizis-i-ozhidaniya-uvolnenij/.	 For	 information	 on	 the	 increase	 of	 regis-
tered	unemployment	see	www.gks.ru	
21	 This	 indicator	 is	 three	 times	higher	 than	a	year	earlier.	Survey	conducted	by	Romir	agen-











































* Reserve Fund value at the beginning of the quarter
Source: Author’s own analysis on the basis of data from the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federa-
tion (www.minfin.ru)




















II. THE SySTEmIc cauSES oF THE EconomIc crISIS – 
THE dySFuncTIonal STaTE govErnancE modEl
Russia’s economic problems are to a great extent merely a manifestation 












This model was based on the absolute dominance of the primary sector in 
the economy, budget revenues and incomes from exports. Incomes	from	
sale	of	oil,	petroleum	products	and	natural	gas	in	pre-crisis	2013	accounted	for	
around	half	of	budget	revenue,	two-thirds	of	export	revenue,	and	17%	of	GDP28.	
The influx of petrodollars to the country (in	the	form	of	the	so-called	‘oil	
rent’,	i.e.	the	profits	owed	to	extensive	factors:	the	very	fact	of	having	and	ex-
porting	oil) ensured the constant growth of budget revenue and spending. 
The real incomes of the population were growing, too (by	even	more	than	
ten	per	cent	in	the	record-breaking	years29).	

































riod of prosperity was characterised by constantly increasing state con-









































of	the	absolute dominance of the executive power and secret services in 





Furthermore, all levels and areas of the Russian state’s operation –	from	big	
contracts	as	part	of	public	procurement	to	education,	healthcare	and	citizen’s	



















































Two conditions needed to be met for the model formed this way to function 









This mechanism began to malfunction when oil prices stopped growing in 
2012. It failed completely after they fell, starting from 2014. The systemic 
problems became evident with double strength in the new reality, above	
all	the	elite’s	kleptocratic	attitude	to	the	state	and	society,	as	well	as	the	fragil-
ity	of	the	foundations	of	economic	growth	based	on	an	unstable	boom	on	the	
raw	material	market.	The state governance model in place so far involved	
structural	problems	being	masked	through	a	constant	increase	in	ineffective	
budget	spending.	In	this	model	economic	calculation	was	becoming	increasingly	







































III. THE anTI-crISIS SHow – THE KrEmlIn’S 
HElplESSnESS In THE FacE oF EconomIc cHallEngES
The Russian government elite has sufficient knowledge of the condition of 
the economy and understands the key problems. This	is	proven,	for	example,	
by	the	analyses	and	forecasts	published	regularly	by	the	Central	Bank,	as	well	as	










motives	(the elite is not ready to share its future income with the public), 






incomes	and	security	to	the	elite.	Thus the ‘reform paradox’ is that the logic 
of the government’s response to the crisis is strongly conditioned by the 
logic of the existing ineffective and anti-reform oriented model focused on 
maintaining stability and control of socio-political life. 
As a result, the government’s anti-crisis tactic is concentrated on several 
basic directions of action which are intended to replace or mitigate the 
lack of real recovery plans. Those	that	need	to	be	singled	out	among	them	
are	temporary	measures	(mainly	economic)	and	extensive	long-term	actions,	
mainly	in	the	area	of	politics	and	propaganda.	
Temporary measures include above all support from the federal budget to 





















The especially bad situation in some sectors (banks,	construction,	and	the	
car	industry)	induced the government to launch a comprehensive financial 

















Maria	 Domańska,	 Rosyjski	 sektor	 bankowy.	 Rok	w	 kryzysie,	OSW Commentary,	 29	March	
2016,	 https://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/komentarze-osw/2016-03-29/rosyjski-sektor-
bankowy-rok-w-kryzysie














































The government has also taken measures to better recognise the potential 













































Another characteristic feature of Russian crisis management is seen in 






Special attention needs to be paid to conscious, cynical moves from the 










































































































Along with the temporary moves intended at neutralising selected mani-
festations of the crisis by way of adequately applied propaganda, the gov-
ernment has also taken long-term action aimed	above	all	at	maintaining	high	
public	support	levels	for	Vladimir	Putin	ahead	of	the	presidential	election.	These	
actions	are	based	on	simulating	the	creation	of	a	state	development	strategy,	

































There is a clear difference of opinion in these discussions66: the need to 
choose between boosting development by increasing budget expenditure 




















66	 For	more	 information	on	proposals	put	 forward	during	 the	discussion	 see,	Путину	посо-
ветовали,	как	вернуть	экономику	к	росту,	26	May	2016,	www.vedomosti.ru
67	 There	 is	 an	excessive	number	of	developmental	 institutions	 in	Russia	 (around	30).	Even	
















The reindustrialisation proposal from the defence industry’s lobby is an 



































































































Kudrin’s proposals appear to be the most well-thought-out and consistent 
of the solutions presented so far, but they will be impossible to implement 
for political reasons because they would undermine the foundations of 









One proof that the reform debates have a purely ritual nature is the way 






































in	the	government	elite.	The real goal of the ‘privatisation’, which	is	tradi-
tionally	associated	with	building	a	liberal	market	economy,	is	thus	in Russian 
conditions temporarily obtaining budget revenues without upsetting the 
state control of the assets, and strengthening the influence and increasing 
the incomes of the circles with close links to the Kremlin. 
President Putin’s official stance on the desirable direction of change has 













The intensification of the discussion on reform and the fact that it is con-












































Iv. IS ruSSIa aT rISK oF a polITIcal crISIS? – 
an aTTEmpTEd ForEcaST
As	the	crisis	continues,	it	is	becoming	clear	that	–	mainly	due	to	the	pessimistic	
forecasts	concerning	oil	prices	–	it is impossible to return to the extensive 






However, the Russian elite will avoid comprehensive and politically risky 
reforms at any price, choosing	instead	temporary,	feigned	and	selective	tacti-
cal	anti-crisis	moves	that	will	boil	down	to	neutralising the risk for the sys-
tem in the period leading up to the presidential election scheduled	for	2018.	
This	strategy	has	been	adopted	most	likely	due	to	hope of a gradual increase in 
oil prices which	will	be	possible	to	capitalise	on	politically	in	view	of	the	elec-







for	sustainable	growth.	Focusing on temporary measures is clear proof of 
the Russian government’s helplessness in the face of strategic challenges. 
Even though the government’s tactic of preservation is	unable	to	success-
fully	reverse	the	stagnation	trend	in	the	Russian	economy	(which	will	in	the	
long	term	adversely	affect	the	interests	of	both	society	and	the	broad	elite	cir-
cles),	paradoxically, it stands a big chance of success in the socio-political 
dimension, at least by the time of the presidential election which is viewed 


























Above all, despite serious financial problems, the government has great 















difficult83.	Although the austerity strategy may generate political risks in	
the	period	leading	up	to	the	election,	apparently,	it has been recognised –	at	
least	temporarily	–	as nevertheless less dangerous to the government elite 
than the implementation of structural reforms. 












































The reasons for the low likelihood of public rebellion against the govern-
ment are slightly different.	The	predominant	need	for	stabilisation	and	the	
unwillingness	to	take	risks	are	partly	an	effect	of	the	memory	of	the	traumatic	
period	of	transformation	in	the	1990s	and	they	strongly	dampen	the	desire	
for	system	reforms.	People’s	behaviour	is	affected	by	the high degree of eco-

















































course	means	that	there are no alternative platforms to the state for form-






88	 http://www.levada.ru.	 Paradoxically,	 even	 the	 ostentatious	 destruction	 of	 Western	 food	
covered	 by	 the	 embargo	 in	 summer	 2015	 did	 not	 provoke	 a	 revolt.	 For	 details	 see:	Maria	
Domańska,	Katarzyna	Chawryło,	The	Kremlin	 steps	up	 the	fight	 against	 contraband	 food-

















There	are	also	strong	psychological and institutional mechanisms limiting 










nomic problems will most likely not be crystallised into political demands 
or even massive economic claims addressed	to	the	government.	The	widely	
shared	belief	that	the	crisis	has	mainly	been	caused	by	external	factors	addi-
tionally	suppresses	the	need	for	change.	
The economic crisis alone will not thus be a catalyst for any major political 































Despite	the	government’s	successes	so	far,	there are still some risks to the 
government elite, mainly linked to possible mistakes in diagnosing and 











The risks may grow after the presidential election and will be linked above 














93	 Н.	Акиндинова,	Я.	Кузьминов,	Е.	Ясин,	op. cit. 
94	 According	 to	 experts’	 estimates,	 over	30%	Russians	 are	 looking	 for	 a	 job	or	 an	opportu-































However, the strong ‘deep structures’ of the Russian state are an impor-










The dynamic of the international situation may affect Russia’s condition in 



















































ernment	elite	appear	highly	unlikely.	At present, the most realistic scenario 
for Russia is long-term stagnation –	without	an	economic	collapse	but	also	
with	no	chance	for	real	growth. Russia will most likely continue to develop 
at a much slower rate than the rest of the world for many years98, and its 
backwardness as compared to the developed countries will become more 
pronounced. 
MARIA DOMAńSKA
98	 While	Russia	 is	 trying	to	overcome	the	recession,	 the	 IMF	forecasted	 in	October	2016	that	
the	 average	 economic	 growth	 worldwide	 will	 reach	 3.4%	 in	 2017;	 http://www.cnbc.
com/2016/07/19/imf-slashes-world-growth-forecasts-again-on-brexit-curveball.html,	
19	July	2016.	
